By R. Jay Wallace
Normativity and the desire collects fourteen very important papers on ethical psychology and useful cause by means of R. Jay Wallace, one of many top philosophers at present operating in those parts. The papers discover the interpenetration of normative and mental concerns in a chain of debates that lie on the middle of ethical philosophy. issues which are addressed contain cause, hope, and the need; accountability, id, and emotion; and the relation among morality and different normative domain names. Wallace's remedies of those subject matters are right away refined and fascinating. Taken jointly, they represent an commercial for a particular means of pursuing matters in ethical psychology and the speculation of sensible cause, they usually articulate and protect a unified framework for brooding about these concerns. the amount additionally contains a beneficial new introduction.
Read or Download Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason PDF
Similar ethics books
Clever advantage provides a particular new account of advantage and happiness as important moral rules. Annas argues that workout a advantage includes sensible reasoning of a type that may illuminatingly be in comparison to the type of reasoning we discover in a person exercise a pragmatic ability. instead of asking firstly how virtues relate to ideas, rules, maximizing, or a last finish, we should always examine the best way the purchase and workout of advantage will be noticeable to be in lots of methods just like the acquisition and workout of extra mundane actions, equivalent to farming, construction or taking part in the piano.
Morality and faith: in detail wed, violently adversarial, or anything else? dialogue of this factor seems in popular culture, the academy, and the media—often producing notably hostile perspectives. At one finish of the spectrum are those that imagine that until God exists, ethics is unfounded and the ethical existence is unmotivated.
Eventually, a entire number of essays that examines and advances moral reviews of the debatable and more and more renowned perform of embryo adoption. within the usa by myself, 400,000 frozen embryos created for in vitro fertilization exist yet are not any longer wanted for that objective.
This publication visits vulnerability in modern British fiction, contemplating vulnerability in its relation to poetics, politics, ethics, and trauma. Vulnerability and chance became critical matters in modern tradition, and inventive productions have more and more made it their accountability to awaken a variety of forms of vulnerabilities, from person fragilities to financial and political sorts of precariousness and dispossession.
- Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? (Institute for Human Sciences Vienna Lecture Series)
- Lectures on the Theory of Ethics (1812) (SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)
- The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics (Blackwell Guides to Great Works)
- Moral Time
Additional info for Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason
But as the analogy with belief shows, the intepretation to opt for would anyway be the second. That is, the rationalist should say that pure practical reason is possible, because agents can acquire both new motivations, and the motivated desires implicated in such motivations, by coming to grasp and understand the particular reasons that they have for acting in certain ways. Of course, for this to be a satisfying account we will need to be convinced that the motivated desires involved here really are explicable solely in terms of the agent’s new beliefs, plus principles or norms of rationality; otherwise what is represented as ‘coming to grasp and understand the particular reason for action that one has’ will not be a genuine case of pure practical reﬂection.
I assume here that when Hume describes the passions as original existences, he is not necessarily denying that they have propositional content, but only denying that their content is ‘representational’—such as aims to ﬁt the way the world is. For discussion of this and other possible interpretations, see Mark Platts, ‘Hume and Morality as a Matter of Fact’, Mind 97 (1988), 189–204, sects. 6–9. ¹⁴ This teleological aspect of action-explanations is entirely left out of account in the argument which Richard Warner gives for the coherence of a rationalist account of motivation, in Freedom, Enjoyment and Happiness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 42–5.
Presumably, everyone would agree ⁴⁹ ‘Internal and External Reasons’, 109. ⁵⁰ Ibid. 109–10. Cf. Brad Hooker, ‘Williams’ Argument against External Reasons’, Analysis, 47 (1987), 42–4, for a similar criticism of this part of Williams’s discussion. ⁵¹ ‘Internal and External Reasons’, 109. How to Argue about Practical Reason 37 that an agent could come to draw a new theoretical conclusion by coming to believe that there is reason to draw that conclusion. But suppose we now ask the question that is the analogue of Williams’s question in the practical case: namely, in what might the content of the belief possibly consist?
Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason by R. Jay Wallace